This paper explores the bene ts and costs of the voter initiative, a direct democracy device that allows voters to make policy decisions without involving their elected representatives. Previous research suggests that by i n troducing competition" into the proposal process, the initiative leads to policies that are closer to the voter's ideal point. In our model, in contrast, the e ect of the initiative is conditional on the severity of representative agency problems and the uncertainty about voter preferences. The initiative always makes the voter better o when representatives are faithful agents, but when voter preferences are uncertain, initiatives can cause shirking" representatives to choose policies farther from the voter's ideal point. Our evidence shows that initiatives reduce state spending when Democrats control the government, when the tax base is vulnerable to common pool" problems, and when citizens have diverse preferences.
I. Introduction
A central goal of political economy research is to understand how non-market institutions allocate resources. The most common institution, and the focus of most studies, is where decisions are made exclusively by elected representatives. Yet in many jurisdictions, resources also are allocated directly by v oters through the use of initiatives. In these jurisdictions, representatives set the initial policies, but voters have the option to override them.
1 Although voter initiatives are highly visible, and an emerging empirical literature suggests that they have signi cant policy e ects, our understanding of the institution's bene ts and costs is in its infancy. 2 The prevailing view in the literature is that initiatives provide a bene t by inducing policy choices closer to those preferred by the median voter. 3 Initiatives are believed to promote median voter outcomes directly, b y replacing bad policies of representatives with those chosen by the voters themselves, and indirectly, b y causing representatives to select 1 An initiative is a referendum that reaches the ballot by citizen petition|usually, after the measure's sponsor collects a predetermined number of signatures from fellow citizens. There are other kinds of referendum that we do not consider, such as referred" measures that are placed on the ballot by the legislature. 2 For example, Matsusaka 1995 nds that states with initiatives spend and tax less than other states, and Gerber 1996 reports di erences in abortion parental noti cation policies. In recent y ears, voter initiatives have been used to cut property taxes, crack d o wn on illegal immigrants, impose term limits on elected o cials, and scale back a rmative action programs. Initiatives were also instrumental in providing for women's su rage, abolishing poll taxes, establishing presidential primary elections, prohibiting and then repealing the prohibition of alcohol, setting environmental protection standards, and reforming campaign nance laws Cronin, 1989 . There is also a small literature focusing on shareholder initiatives in corporations, for example, Karpo , Malatesta, and Walkling 1996 . 3 For instance, see Denzau, Mackay, and Weaver 1981 and Gerber 1996 . more favorable policies initially to stave o the threat of an initiative. Intuitively, an initiative allows entry" into decisionmaking that is otherwise monopolized by representatives, leading to policies that are closer to the competitive" median voter outcome.
This view of the initiative seems fundamentally incomplete. Initiatives are not the rule| only 23 of 50 states and half of the municipalities in the United States permit them. If direct resource allocation can only result in policies closer to the median voter's position, it is di cult to explain why initiatives are not more common, especially at the local level where Tiebout competition should put pressure on governments to adopt policies that please the voters. What we are missing is an understanding of the costs of direct decisionmaking.
The goal of this paper is to develop a simple model in which initiatives have costs as well as bene ts, and thereby provide a way to begin thinking about the tradeo s between direct and representative decisionmaking. We study a model with three actors, a representative, an interest group, and a voter, in which agenda control issues and agency problems between the voter and the representative play important roles. 4 The representative makes the initial policy choice. When initiatives are unavailable, this policy stands. When initiatives are possible, the interest group can pay a cost and make a counterproposal; the voter then chooses either the representative's or the interest group's proposal.
The key di erence between our model and the existing literature is that we assume that the representative and interest group face some uncertainty about the voter's preferences.
Uncertainty a ects the tradeo between direct and representative resource allocation in two important w ays. First, it makes initiatives valuable simply because they provide the voter with a choice: the ultimate policy will be closer to the voter's ideal point if he selects from a menu of possibilities instead of having a policy chosen for him. For this reason, direct decisionmaking can be desirable even if the representative does not shirk," and even if initiatives propose more extreme policies than the representative.
The second and more surprising e ect of uncertainty is on the behavior of the representative. When preferences are known with certainty, the representative ignores interest groups that threaten an initiative farther from the voter's ideal point than the representative's choice because such an initiative is sure to be rejected by the voter. However, when voter preferences are uncertain, even an extreme interest group's initiative could turn out to match the voter's preferences and end up defeating the representative's policy in an election.
To a void this risk, the representative m a y nd it optimal to choose a policy closer to the interest group's ideal point. This can deter the interest group from proposing its initiative i f the cost of initiating is high enough. Consequently, the threat of an initiative can cause the representative to adopt a more extreme policy than he would have otherwise. We therefore show h o w a vailability of the initiative can lead to policy choices that are farther from the voter's ideal point than if there were no initiative. This provides a logical foundation for the objection that initiatives increase the power of special interest groups at the expense of the common good." 5 However, in another sense our results stand the conventional wisdom on its head. The usual argument i n f a vor of direct resource allocation is that it gives the electorate a weapon against representatives who act against the voters' interests. That is, initiatives are valuable when representatives are bad. While this can happen as a special case in our model, the general pattern is that 1 direct resource allocation always makes the electorate better o 5 For example, Magleby 1984, page 29 says: Groups with money will set the agenda of direct legislation by placing measures they desire on the ballot and then nancing the campaign for passage. In the event that a proposition runs counter to their political desires, they will dominate the ensuing campaign and defeat the issue. Thus, under direct legislation it is not the people who rule but the special interests." However, our results suggest that the power of interest groups arises through their ability to distort representative behavior, not through an ability to dominate initiative elections. The most comprehensive reference available on the role of interest groups in the direct legislation process is the valuable study by Gerber 1997 . when there is no agency problem with representatives, and 2 direct resource allocation can make the electorate worse o only when there is an agency problem. The main reason is that the representative has an incentive to adjust policy to deter an initiative only when he has a policy preference as opposed to a desire to maximize the welfare of the voter. Our results suggest that giving an interest group the power to in uence the agenda is a two-edged sword: when a moderate interest group makes the proposals, the voters are better o , but they can be made worse o when an extreme interest group appears.
The central idea of our paper is that direct decisionmaking has both bene ts and costs.
A major implication is that the overall e ect of the initiative on the voter's utility and on policy is conditional, depending on the factors that determine the bene ts and costs. The factors we emphasize are the nature of representation and uncertainty about voter preferences. Our model suggests that the initiative has the greatest e ect when representatives have extreme preferences and when uncertainty about preferences is great. To see if the e ect of the initiative is in fact conditional on these factors, we examine U.S. state and local expenditure data from 1960 to 1990. As documented in Matsusaka 1995 , states with initiatives tend to spend less than representative-only states. We nd that the initiative has the largest anti-spending e ect in states where 1 Democrats control both the executive and the legislature, 2 the number of legislative districts is large which is theoretically linked to scal common pool" problems Weingast, Shepsle, and Johnsen, 1981 , and 3 the population is heterogeneous which w e i n terpret as having less predictable voter preferences.
In the next section of the paper, we present the model. Section III describes the solution of the model. Section IV identi es the basic bene ts and costs of voter initiatives. Section V develops testable implications concerning policies and the number of initiatives. Section VI presents evidence on the e ect of the initiative on state and local scal policy. Section VII summarizes and discusses extensions.
II. A Spatial Model of the Two Decisionmaking Institutions
A policy x 2 must be chosen. The policy a ects the welfare of a voter, a representative, and an interest group. Under monopolistic representative" MR decisionmaking, the policy is selected by the representative. Under direct-and-representative" DR decisionmaking, the representative selects a policy but the interest group can make a counter-proposal, in which case the voter chooses between the two options.
A. Preferences
The voter has utility V x = ,jx , vj;
where v is his ideal point. To capture uncertainty about preferences, we assume that v takes on one of three values, ,, 0 , a n d , with probabilities , 1 , 2 , and , respectively. Note that 0 1=2. The amount of uncertainty about preferences is parameterized by .
The utility of the interest group is Ix = ,jx , ij , C; where i is the ideal point, is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the group makes an initiative proposal, and C 0 is the exogenous cost of doing so. We will study three types of interest groups, corresponding to voter types, with i equal to ,, 0, and . The parameter C represents signature-gathering costs, registration fees, and other opportunity costs associated with an initiative campaign. The voter's ideal point is known only by the voter and he has no way of conveying this information to the other parties. 7 A natural interpretation is that v is the ideal point of the median voter|it is uncertain from the viewpoint of the interest group and representative due to their limited information or randomness in turnout. 8 The ideal points of the interest group and representative are common knowledge, as are all of the other parameters.
C. Sequence of Actions
Under the MR institution, resource allocation begins and ends with the representative selecting a policy. All parties then take their payo s.
Under the DR institution, the sequence is more involved see Figure 1 : i an interest group arrives with ideal point i; ii the representative c hooses a policy x r ; iii the interest group decides whether to accept x r or pay the cost C and propose an initiative policy x i ;
6 See the special June 1993 issue of Public Choice 1993 and Peltzman 1984 . 7 A formally equivalent approach is to assume that the voter himself is unsure what policy is in his best interest until after he hears the pro and con arguments during the campaign.
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In practice, polling can reduce uncertainty, but not entirely because of measurement error and the possibility that voters change their minds after hearing competing arguments. The fact that many propositions enjoy majority support in early polls yet ultimately fail is illustration Magleby, 1984 . and iv if a counterproposal is made, the voter's preferences are determined, and he decides between x r and x i . The DR sequence incorporates the regularity that interest groups take their cases to the representatives before going forward with a costly initiative. Therefore, when representatives make their policy choices, they know the nature of the threat that waits in the wings.
III. Equilibrium Behavior of the Voter and Interest Group
We begin by c haracterizing equilibrium behavior for the voter and interest group under DR resource allocation. If an initiative is proposed, the last actor is the voter. Faced with a choice between x i and x r , h e c hooses the policy closest to his ideal point. The proposal that is smaller in absolute value will be supported by the moderate voter type and one of the extreme types we ignore the dominated strategies of jx i j and jx r j . Therefore, the probability that x i defeats x r is 9 px i ; x r = 
MR and DR Resource Allocation
Under the MR institution, whatever policy the representative proposes becomes law.
Given that v is distributed symmetrically around zero, the optimal policy is x r = 0. This delivers an expected payo to the voter of ,2 . Now suppose that initiatives are available. The representative's optimal strategy is to select the policy that complements the initiative and provides the voter with the most attractive menu o f c hoices when the initiative comes to a vote. If i = 0, then x i = 0; the interest group proposes the representative's optimal monopoly policy. The representative then maximizes the voter's expected utility with a positive-value policy that solves min xr + j , x r j; giving x r = ; similarly, x r = , is the best negative-value policy. The payo in either case is E V = , .
When i = , the interest group chooses x i = if x r ,z, and x i = ,x r otherwise.
Then the representative c hooses x r to solve max xr 8 :
, + x r , 1 , 2 jx r j if x r ,z; ,2 + x r , 1 , 2 jx r j if x r , z. The solution is x r = 0 i f 1=3, and x r = , if 1=3, which gives a payo of E V = , minf ; 1 , 2 g. I n w ords, the representative c hooses the policy most likely to be the voter's ideal point from among the positions not taken by the interest group. The case of i = , is symmetric.
Comparison of the Institutions
The di erence between the voter's expected utility under DR and MR given i, E V jDR , E V jMR = 4 is non-negative. In the absence of an agency problem, the voter is always better o when the initiative i s a vailable. This is because the representative uses the initiative to give the voter a second choice, which makes the adopted policy closer to the voter's ideal point. We summarize this in the following proposition.
Proposition 1: When there is no agency problem, the voter's expected utility is at least as high with DR allocation than with MR resource allocation.
Remarks
Proposition 1 is driven by a bene t of DR allocation that has not been recognized in the literature, namely, that the voter is made better o simply by h a ving a choice. Alternatively, the proposition can be seen as identifying a cost of MR allocation: even a well-intentioned representative inadvertantly may c hoose a policy that the voter does not like. Because of this bene t, we nd some value in having an initiative e v en when the representative is faithful.
This contrasts with the existing literature in which initiatives are bene cial only when there is an agency problem.
The analysis also suggests why a successful initiative m a y catalyze similar policy changes in other jurisdictions. For example, California's Proposition 13 is said to have spurred" Ladd and Tideman, 1981 and started" Magleby, 1984 a national taxpayer revolt. When an initiative passes, it reveals information about voter preferences. The information is likely to be particularly surprising when an extreme initiative passes. We expect a reaction from other jurisdictions for two reasons: a vote-maximizing representative will adjust his policy position toward the revealed preference, and interest groups will be more inclined to promote their favored policy if they discover it has a constituency. A similar argument might explain why initiative campaigns tell voters they can send a message" by v oting in favor. 10 It can be seen from equation 4 that DR becomes increasingly valuable relative t o M R as rises, other things equal. Intuitively, when the voter's preferences are more variable, the representative is more likely to choose the wrong policy so it is better for the voter to make the decision. This suggests that the DR institution provides the largest bene ts to the voter in jurisdictions where representatives are rather uncertain about the voter's preferences. Thus, we might expect DR to be more useful in a big heterogeneous city than a small homogeneous town if representatives know less about their constituents in the former than the latter, as seems plausible.
11
For the same reason we might expect DR decisionmaking 10 These implications distinguish our approach from models in which v oters are uncertain about the policy consequences of a proposed initiative for instance, Gerber and Lupia 1995 . While the two approaches share some implications, in a model with policy uncertainty nothing is learned about the voters from the outcome of an initiative election. Therefore, such models do not predict that successful initiatives are mimicked and they do not capture the notion that initiatives can be used to send a message to representatives. 11 In fact, the DR institution is more common in large cities than small cities Renner and DeSantis, 1993 . to be more bene cial in cities where i the population has undergone signi cant turnover, for example, due to immigration, ii the population is more heterogeneous demographically, and iii representatives are less informed, for example, where legislators have small sta s or are not professionals. If governments adopt e cient o r v ote-maximizing institutions for example, if Tiebout competition is present then these observations could be recast as empirical predictions about which cities are likely to have DR decisionmaking.
B. Agency Problem = 1
This section studies the case = 1, where the representative's utility i s Rx = ,jx , rj.
MR and DR Resource Allocation
Under the MR institution, the representative's optimal choice is to set the policy at his ideal point, x r = r.
Under the DR institution, the representative m a y not set the policy at his ideal point.
The representative knows that if he selects a policy that deters the initiative, the policy will stand, but if his policy does not deter then the interest group will propose an initiative x i given by equation 2, and the voter will choose between them. Then the representative's problem is max xr E R = do. Otherwise, deterrence is costly to the representative and may not be optimal. We rst characterize the representative's optimal non-deterring policy and then turn to the issue of deterrence. Lemma 1 states the optimal policies. The proof, which is fairly mechanical, is given in the appendix.
Lemma 1: If the representative does not deter the initiative, then x r = r except when a r = 0 , jij = , and 1=3, o r b jr , ij = 2 . When a or b hold, jx r j = z.
Now w e consider deterrence. The representative w ould like to push the policy toward his ideal point, but if he sets the policy too far from the interest group's ideal point, an initiative will be proposed. Because of uncertainty about the voter's preferences, the initiative m a y pass, and the representative m a y end up with a policy he particularly dislikes. The solution is to deter when i is close to r and allow the initiative when i and r are far apart. Intuitively, when i and r are close, the representative only needs to move a little from his ideal policy to deter. When i and r are distant, the representative has to choose a policy far from his ideal point to deter, and he would rather take his chances with the initiative. As this suggests, there is a critical distance between the two ideal points, below which deterrence is optimal.
The critical values of the region are straightforward to calculate. We state the next lemma and consign the proof to the appendix. An important property which w e will employ below is that is increasing in .
Comparison of the Institutions
We can now compare the voter's expected utility under MR and DR allocation when there is an agency problem. First, when the representative's ideal point deters, availability of the initiative has no e ect. The representative c hooses x r = r regardless of whether the initiative i s a vailable, and an initiative is not proposed.
The second case is when r 6 = i but the representative nds it optimal to deter the initiative. Although the voter does not bene t from having a second choice, under DR the threat of a counterproposal causes the representative t o c hoose a policy closer to i than under MR. When the interest group is moderate, i = 0, and the representative is extreme, r = , the representative c hooses x r = under MR, and chooses x r = C=1 , under DR.
The initiative is deterred but the voter ends up with a more appealing policy because of the initiative threat. This is the conventional bene t of direct decisionmaking: by breaking the representative's agenda setting monopoly, he can be forced to adopt more favorable policies.
The most interesting case is when deterrence is optimal, the interest group is extreme, i = , and the representative is moderate, r = 0 . Under MR, the representative c hooses x r = 0, while under DR he chooses x r = ,C= . Here the threat of the initiative causes the representative t o c hoose a policy less desirable to the voter. As a result, the voter is worse o under DR than MR. This captures an important cost of direct decisionmaking: by taking away the representative's agenda setting monopoly, D R m a y lead a moderate representative to adopt more extreme policies to accomodate an extreme interest group.
Finally, when the representative c hooses not to deter, the initiative gives the voter a valuable choice. This tends to make DR better for the voter than MR. The exception is when r = 0 and 1=4. Under these conditions, the voter nds the menu o f c hoices under DR z and ,z less attractive than the policy x r = 0 under MR.
We summarize these results in the next proposition.
Proposition 2: When there is an agency problem, the voter is at least as well o with DR than MR decisionmaking, except when the representative is moderate, the interest group is extreme, and either a C , or b C and 1=4.
Remarks
These results highlight both an important bene t and cost of DR resource allocation.
The bene t is that an extreme representative can be forced to adopt a more moderate policy by an initiative threat from a moderate interest group. This is the bene t most commonly attributed to the DR institution. But there is a cost: a moderate representative can end up adopting a more extreme policy when threatened by an extreme interest group.
Interestingly, this suggests that if the representative process works well enough to elect a moderate representative, the DR institution can hurt.
The conventional view of the initiative is that it is a useful tool by which v oters can address agency problems with their representatives. In a sense, Propositions 1 and 2 taken together stand this view on its head. Proposition 1 shows that DR always helps when there is not an agency problem, while Proposition 2 shows that DR can hurt only when there is an agency problem. V. Other Implications A. Policy Consequences As noted above, empirical research shows that DR decisionmaking yields systematically di erent policy outcomes than MR decisionmaking. Here we note the model's policy predic-
tions. An important point is that the e ect of decisionmaking institution is conditional on the representative and interest group ideal points, and the amount of uncertainty. W e rst state the main results, and then discuss the underlying logic.
Proposition 3: a The expected policy is more extreme under DR than MR when the representative is moderate, and the expected policy is more moderate when the representative is extreme. b The DR institution has a more extreme less moderating e ect on policy when preference uncertainty rises.
The logic behind part a is this: First, if the representative is moderate, he will set the policy at x = 0 under the MR institution. Under the DR institution, the expected policy will be pulled in the direction of the interest group, and therefore become more extreme, either because the representative adjusts his choice to deter an initiative, or because the interest group's extreme initiative has some chance of winning. If the representative is extreme, on the other hand, the DR institution will result in more moderate policies by causing the representative t o c hoose a more moderate deterring policy, o r b y opening up the possibility that a moderate initiative is approved.
Part b of Proposition 3 underlines the importance of preference uncertainty. If the representative is moderate, the DR institution leads to increasingly extreme policies as rises. If the representative is extreme, DR leads to more moderate policies, but they become less moderate as rises. The logic is the same in both cases. A high value of strengthens the position of the extreme interest groups, and weakens the moderate group. Thus, the representative m ust be more acccomodating more extreme to deter the extreme groups, and less accomodating less moderate to deter the moderate group. If, on the other hand, the representative c hooses not to deter, a high value of makes it more likely that the extreme proposal will be approved. 14 Proposition 3 is testable in principle if the positions of the agents and the amount o f preference uncertainty can be measured. We illustrate several approaches in Section VI.
B. Number of Initiatives
In some states, like California and Oregon, voters face dozens of initiatives each decade while in other states, like W y oming, initiatives are extremely rare. How can we account for the cross-sectional variation in the number of initiatives among those jurisdictions where direct decisionmaking is available?
The model points in several directions. An initiative occurs when the representative chooses not to deter, which means that the number of initiatives depends on whether or not jr , ij C= see Lemma 1 holding constant the representative's and interest group's ideal points. The representative deters when the inequality is satis ed. It follows that more initiatives will be allowed when C is low and is high recall that is increasing in . The result for C is not surprising. The result for implies that initiatives are more common when the representative faces greater uncertainty about constituent preferences. Uncertain preferences increase an extreme proposal's electoral prospects. This makes it easier to deter a moderate group and harder to deter an extreme group. If the representative is moderate, an increase in preference uncertainty reduces his expected utility from deterrence and from non-deterrence because he is more likely to lose the initiative election. If the representative is extreme, it increases his expected utility from both deterrence and non-deterrence. In both cases, the former e ect dominates the latter.
One way to think about preference uncertainty, as discussed above, is as an attribute of a jurisdiction. The model predicts that there will be more initiatives in jurisdictions with greater uncertainty about preferences. This may be part of the reason why initiatives are used so often in diverse California and so rarely in homogeneous Wyoming. Another way to think of preference uncertainty is as an attribute of an issue. Some issues might present the representative with very little uncertainty about the voter's preferences, for example, whether or not locate a nuclear waste dump nearby. Other issues might be fraught with uncertainty, for example, distributional issues concerning government spending and taxes.
The model predicts that the latter type of issue is more likely to appear on initiatives than the former type of issue.
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The relation between the number of initiatives and the position of the representative depends on C and . There are three regions of interest. The rst is a su ciently large C and or a su ciently small so that C 1 , minf ; = 2 , 3 g. In this case, a moderate representative deters all interest groups; an extreme representative deters a moderate interest group and a like-minded extreme group, but nds it too costly to deter opposite extreme interest groups. Therefore, initiatives are more common when the representative i s extreme. This situation captures the view that a large number of initiatives is symptomatic of dissatisfaction with elected representatives. For example, Matsusaka 1992 shows that the number of initiatives in California was particularly high in the 1920s and 1980s, two periods that featured signi cant discontent with the state legislature. In the 1920s, dissatisfaction was centered on the in uence of the Southern Paci c Railroad. In the 1980s, a Democratic gerrymander of the state resulted in Democrats controlling roughly two-thirds of the seats in the legislature while polling only about half of the votes. However, the model also indicates that initiatives can be common even when the representative is moderate. This happens in an intermediate" region where C and satisfy 1 , C 1 , minf ; = 2 , 3 g. Then the moderate representative deters only the moderate interest group while the extreme representative deters all but an opposite extreme interest group. Therefore, a moderate representative is more likely to attract an initiative than an extreme representative.
In the third region, C 1 , , only interest groups with the same ideal point a s the representative are deterred. The number of initiatives depends on the frequency that di erent t ypes of interest groups appear.
The theoretical results are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 4: a More initiatives appear when the cost of initiating is low and uncertainty about voter preferences is high. b When C is su ciently large is su ciently small, more initiatives appear when the representative is moderate; when C and take on intermediate" values, more initiatives occur when the representative is extreme; and when C is su ciently low is su ciently high, the number of initiatives depends on the distribution of interest group types.
VI. Some Evidence: Fiscal Policy and the Initiative
A major implication of our paper is that the e ect of the initiative on the voter's utility and the policy is conditional on the nature of representation and the uncertainty about voter preferences. This stands in contrast to most of the empirical literature which looks for unconditional e ects of the initiative for example, Matsusaka 1995 and Gerber 1996 . In this section we provide some evidence to suggest that the e ect of the initiative is in fact conditional on the factors we h a ve emphasized.
Because it is di cult to measure the voter's utility, w e do not pursue the implications of Propositions 1 and 2. Instead, we focus on Proposition 3, which describes how the initiative a ects the expected policy. As the proposition suggests, we expect the policy consequences of the initiative to depend on the relation between the preferences of actors and on the amount of uncertainty about voter preferences. The variables of interest are not observed directly, so our empirical strategy is to identify variables that theory or intuition suggest are correlated with the variables we w ant, and see if they in uence policy decisions in a way that is consistent with our model.
We focus on scal policy, speci cally, the total spending of U.S. state and local governments from 1960 to 1990. This is a natural policy to study because the data are good, and there is a pre-existing empirical literature from which to draw control variables for example, Peltzman 1992 , Matsusaka 1995 , Gilligan and Matsusaka 1995 Our analysis is built around a series of regressions of the form Table 1 , and summary statistics are given. These controls are intended to capture bene ts and costs of public spending. We also include a dummy for the 11 states of the Old South, and 7 year dummies, but do not report their coe cients. Panel C of Table 1 The regressions make use of the cross-sectional variation in availability of the initiative.
At the start of our sample period, 20 of 50 states allowed citizens to propose and approve laws directly. By the end of the period, 23 states allowed initiatives. The basic research strategy is to see if initiative states select di erent scal policies than non-initiative states and if so, to determine whether the e ects of the initiative are conditional on the factors emphasized in our model. Column 1 of Table 2 provides a baseline regression of spending on a dummy v ariable equal to 1 if the state provides for the initiative and the controls.
This measures the unconditional e ect of the initiative. Essentially as in Matsusaka 1995 , states with initiatives spent $44.39 per capita less on average than those with monopoly representatives.
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The remaining regressions in Table 2 test whether the e ect of the initiative is conditional on the nature of representation. Theory predicts that the initiative's e ect depends on whether or not the preferences of the representatives are extreme relative to those of the voters. We rst try to capture a divergence between the preferences of the representatives and voters with two dummy v ariables, one for the Democrats and one for the Republicans, equal to 1 if all branches of the state's government lower house, upper house, and governor were controlled by the same party.
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The idea is that when one party controls all of the government, the legislature's preferences might be more extreme than the median voter's.
The summary statistics show that Democrats monopolized the government in 40 percent o f the observations compared to 15 percent for the Republicans. The regression in column 2 of Table 2 adds the two dummy v ariables to the regression in column 1. It can be seen that one-party control did not have a signi cant e ect on spending after accounting for income, population growth, etc. This is consistent with a large literature on party e ects, for example, Blais, Blake, and Dion 1993 and Matsusaka 1995 . In the column 3 regression, we add interaction terms that measure the e ect of the initiative conditional on 17 We adjust for heterskedasticity b y using White standard errors. 18 The omitted category is divided government.
one-party control of the government. The interaction term for Democratic control is negative and signi cant at better than the 5 percent level. The coe cient on the initiative dummy itself falls and becomes negligible. This says that the e ect of the initiative w as conditional on control of the government b y the Democratic party. Indeed, the results suggest that the initiative w as used almost exclusively to cut back the spending of Democratic-controlled governments. This story is consistent with Peltzman's 1992 nding that voters penalized increased spending by Democratic governors but not Republican governors.
The second set of variables we use to capture preference divergences between the representatives and the voters is the number of seats in the state legislature's upper and lower house. These variables are motivated by the common pool logrolling theory of spending Buchanan and Tullock, 1962 . As formalized by W eingast, Shepsle, and Johnsen 1981 , each dollar of spending in a legislator's district, say to build a road, generates 1 dollar of bene ts for his constituents but imposes only a cost of 1=Nth of a dollar, where N is the number of districts, because revenue is raised from broad-based taxes that are spread over all districts. The familiar common pool logic implies that as N becomes larger, the perceived cost of spending declines, and overall spending increases. Some evidence for this view of pork barrel spending can be found in Inman and Fitts 1990 , Del Rossi 1995 , Gilligan and Matsusaka 1995 , and Del Rossi and Inman 1997 The regression in column 4 adds the two seats variables to regression 1. Consistent with the common pool theory, spending is positively related to the number of seats in the upper house. However, it is negatively related to the number of seats in the lower house.
The regression in column 5 introduces interactions between the initiative dummy and the number of seats. Again, we nd evidence that the e ect of the initiative is conditional. As the number of seats in the upper chamber increases which w e i n terpret to mean that the common pool problem becomes more severe, the initiative pushes down spending more.
The nal column of the table includes all of the representation variables at once. One might expect that our two sets are capturing the same underlying factor, but this does not appear to be the case. The e ect of the initiative remains conditional on both factors at approximately the same levels of statistical signi cance. Table 3 investigates whether the initiative is conditional on the amount of uncertainty about voter preferences. We are particularly interested in these results because identi cation of this factor is one of the novel contributions of our paper. It is not obvious how t o measure uncertainty about preferences, but we might expect uncertainty to be correlated with the heterogeneity of the population. The idea is that in a small homogeneous town, the representatives probably have a good idea about voter preferences, while in a large city with a diverse population, representatives may nd it di cult to know what the median voter wants. Our rst variable, admittedly crude, is the population of the state. We expect that in a large state such as California it is harder to know what the voters want than in a small state like W y oming. The regression in column 1 of Table 3 adds an interaction term between the initiative dummy and the state's population to the basic regression in column 1 of Table 2 . As can be seen, the coe cient on the interaction term is negative and signi cant at better than the 5 percent level. While this provides additional evidence of the conditionality of the e ect of initiatives, it falls short of a formal test of the model because the e ect of uncertainty can be positive or negative in theory. In terms of Proposition 3, our results to this point are most consistent with the situation where interest groups tend to be conservative i = , and representatives are moderate r = 0 or liberal r = . With these con gurations, i the initiative unconditionally reduces spending, and ii an increase in uncertainty causes an even larger decline of spending. Intuitively, preference uncertainty increases the chance that a conservative initiative will pass, which tilts the representative t o the right or forces him to allow the initiative to appear.
We next consider a more direct measure of population heterogeneity, the percentage of the population that lives in a metropolitan area times the percentage that does not. This variable attains its theoretical maximum when the population is evenly divided between urban and rural areas. In column 2 we add this measure directly to the regression in column 1, and in column 3 we add an interaction between the initiative v ariable and the urban-rural variable. There is weak evidence of conditionality here. Heterogeneity again appears to have made the initiative more e ective in cutting spending, but the coe cient i s only on the edge of statistical signi cance. The conclusion is less ambiguous in the regression of column 4 where we include both heterogeneity v ariables and their interactions. As can be seen, both interactions are negative and statistically signi cant at better than the 1 percent level. This makes a stronger case for the importance of preference uncertainty because the coe cients are signi cant, and also because they both are negative, which tells a consistent story. The story is that on average, throughout the sample period, states tended to have moderate-to-liberal representatives, and the typical interest group using the initiative process was conservative.
The nal regression, in column 5 of Table 3 , includes all of the variables we h a ve considered so far. The results are essentially unchanged. We continue to see statistically signi cant evidence of conditionality in the e ect of the initiative.
Our initiative v ariables are rather crude proxies for the factors in the model. None of our regressions constitutes a formal test of the model, but taken together, the results tend to support the idea that the e ect of the initiative is conditional on the nature of the representative process and the amount of uncertainty about voter preferences. 19
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We also estimated the regressions without Wyoming, without states that adopted the initiative during the sample period, and with a dummy for states west of the Mississippi. The results were the same as those we report in all important respects.
VII. Summary and Extensions
This paper develops a model of political resource allocation that focuses on the procedures used to make decisions. We use the model to study the tradeo s between two common decisionmaking institutions, monopoly decisionmaking by representatives and joint decisionmaking by representatives and voter initiatives. We view this as a step toward understanding the growing empirical literature documenting that the method of decisionmaking matters for outcomes.
The building blocks of our model are 1 an agency problem between the voter and representative, 2 assignment of agenda control, and 3 uncertainty about the voter's policy preferences. The rst two are mainstays of the existing literature. They give rise to the conventional view that initiatives help the voter by breaking the representative's monopoly over the agenda. Our contribution is to emphasize the third building block, preference uncertainty. W e show that when voter preferences are uncertain, the initiative has both bene ts and costs. As a result, policies are not necessarily closer to median voter outcomes in DR jurisdictions than MR jurisdictions|the threat of an initiative can cause the representative to adopt a more extreme policy than he would have otherwise.
As for the broad question|does availability of the initiative make the voter better or worse o ?|we nd that the answer depends on the amount of preference uncertainty and the severity of the voter-representative agency problem. The voter bene ts from or at least is not hurt by the initiative when preferences are very uncertain, or when there is no agency problem, or when there is an agency problem but the representative is extreme. The voter is hurt by the initiative only when preferences are fairly certain, there is an agency problem, and the representative is moderate. Thus, although an important point of the paper is identifying a potential cost of initiatives, perhaps the main message is that these costs are decisive only in a particular set of circumstances.
Much w ork obviously remains to be done. Our model does not incorporate any notion of expertise on the part of the representative, and therefore abstracts away from the specialization bene t that is surely an important reason for delegated decisionmaking. We also assume that the voter is capable of determining which of the policy options is in his best interest. A natural starting point to address the issues of expertise and voter ignorance would be to include policy uncertainty along the lines of Gilligan and Krehbiel 1987 . This would presumably make resource allocation by representatives more valuable. It would then be possible to study the e ect of di erent institutions on the incentives to acquire information, an important issue addressed recently by Aghion and Tirole 1997 . A signaling role for interest groups and endorsements would also arise, as in Gerber and Lupia 1995 .
Another issue we ignore is competition between interest groups|our model contains a single group. We suspect that our basic bene ts and costs would be present i n a m ulti-group environment a s w ell. Initiatives would still have v alue by providing a choice. Representatives no longer would be able to forestall all initiatives, but they would nd it optimal to deter at least one of them in some circumstances. Thus, uncertainty w ould continue to pull the policy away from the representative's ideal point. Some new strategic considerations would arise, however, concerning how decisions with multiple initiatives are resolved.
Although we h a ve focused on public sector decisionmaking, the analysis could be recast Note. All financial variables are expressed in 1990 dollars using the CPI. Data sources are given in Matsusaka [1995] and Gilligan and Matsusaka [1995] . Mineral production data were updated using Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1996 States, , 1997 Note. Each column is a regression. The dependent variable is state and local direct general expenditure per capita. White standard errors are in parentheses beneath the coefficient estimates. Significance levels are indicated by (*) 10%, (**) 5%, and (***) 1%. Variables are defined in Table 1 . The basic data cover 49 states (Alaska is excluded) and 7 years (1960, 1965,…, 1985, 1990) . (a) Coefficients and standard errors are multiplied by 10 for readability. Note. Each column is a regression. The dependent variable is state and local direct general expenditure per capita. White standard errors are in parentheses beneath the coefficient estimates. Significance levels are indicated by (*) 10%, (**) 5%, and (***) 1%. Variables are defined in Table 1 . The basic data cover 49 states (Alaska is excluded) and 7 years (1960, 1965,…, 1985, 1990) . (a) Coefficients and standard errors are multiplied by 10 for readability.
